By Kirubel Tesfaye
The wars in Sudan and Ethiopia are increasingly connected by allegations of cross-border military involvement and competing political narratives circulating on social media, which risk deepening mistrust and heightening tensions in the region.
Posts, videos and images have been used to allege that Ethiopia is supporting Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while other claims accuse Sudanese actors of backing Tigrayan fighters. Some of these posts present images of military camps, armed personnel and aircraft as evidence of foreign involvement. But how much do these claims actually reveal about what is happening on the ground?
An open-source investigation combining satellite imagery, geolocation, reverse-image searches and analysis of social media content examined several of the claims linking the two conflicts. The investigation assessed alleged RSF activity in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, claims that Tigrayan fighters are operating in Sudan, and viral images and videos used to support allegations of military involvement. We found that some posts use old or misleadingly presented imagery to support claims about current events, while other allegations require further corroboration.
The tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan are rooted in overlapping conflicts that have reshaped the Horn of Africa in recent years. The war between Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which began in November 2020, ended formally with the signing of the Pretoria Agreement on November 2, 2022. The agreement, signed in South Africa, established a cessation of hostilities and provided for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of Tigrayan forces.
The conflict involved forces beyond the Ethiopian federal army and Tigrayan fighters. Amhara regional forces and Fano militias fought alongside federal forces, while Eritrean troops also participated in the war. The conflict also affected Ethiopia’s relations with neighbouring Sudan. As Ethiopian troops were redeployed from border areas to fight in Tigray, Sudanese forces moved into the disputed Al-Fashaga territory, according to reports published in December 2020. This added another source of tension along the two countries’ shared border.
The Pretoria Agreement did not resolve all of Ethiopia’s internal security challenges. On April 6, 2023, the federal government announced plans to dissolve regional special forces and integrate their members into the national defence force, federal forces or regional police. The decision triggered opposition and protests in the Amhara region, where many viewed it as a threat to regional security and autonomy.
The move came amid efforts to demobilise and reintegrate former combatants. On March 31, 2023, National Rehabilitation Commissioner Teshome Toga announced consultations on the process, including in Amhara. Armed clashes subsequently broke out in the region in April 2023, opening another front in Ethiopia’s internal conflicts.
Screenshot shows a post by Tsehome Toga (PhD) about the Amhara region DDR process
Oluṣẹgun Ọbasanjọ, General Tadesse Worede, Field Martial Birhanu Jula, Uhuru Kenyatta at the conclusion of the Pretoria agreement in November 2022
Meanwhile, Sudan descended into a separate but increasingly interconnected crisis. On April 15, 2023, fighting erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), commanded by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. The immediate dispute centred on plans to integrate the RSF into Sudan’s national army following the 2021 military coup. Fighting began in Khartoum and spread to other parts of the country, including Darfur, Kordofan and Al Jazirah, causing widespread civilian suffering, displacement and hunger.
By 2026, tensions had also resurfaced in Tigray. Following months of friction between TPLF leaders and the federal government, the TPLF sidelined the federal-backed Tigray Interim Administration in April. On August 1, heavy fighting reportedly erupted between Ethiopian federal forces and TPLF fighters near the Sudanese border, including around Shererina. Reports that civilians and wounded TPLF fighters fled into Sudan added to concerns about the regional consequences of Ethiopia’s renewed conflict.
Together, these developments provide the backdrop to a growing exchange of accusations. Allegations that Ethiopia is supporting the RSF have been met with counterclaims that Sudanese actors are backing Tigrayan forces.
Allegations of RSF activity inside Ethiopia
Allegations that the Ethiopian government’s involvement in Sudan’s civil war gained renewed attention in February 2026 when Reuters reported that an alleged training camp in the country’s western Benishangul-Gumuz region was being used to train RSF fighters. Based on interviews with officials and other sources, satellite imagery and internal documents, the report described a camp near the Sudanese border and new infrastructure at the nearby Assosa Airport.
“The camp constitutes the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s civil war, marking a potentially dangerous development that provides the RSF a substantial supply of fresh soldiers as fighting escalates in Sudan’s south,” the investigation noted.
An internal Ethiopian security note reviewed by Reuters reportedly stated that 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing training at the site in early January 2026. Sources interviewed by the outlet had claimed that the United Arab Emirates was funding the site’s construction and provided military trainers as well as logistical support. The UAE government has, however, denied involvement in the conflict.
In a joint statement issued on January 6 2026, the Ethiopian and Emirati governments reaffirmed their commitment to one another’s security and territorial integrity and condemned attacks against civilians.
Screenshot shows a joint statement of UAE and Ethiopia about the current situation in Sudan and other posts on X
In countering the claim of the RSF training camp and the Ethiopian government supporting the RSF as a military base, certain social media posts on X and Facebook alleged that the camp wasn’t a training camp but a project associated with a gold mining area.
“Our analysis suggests these sites are far more likely to be gold mining camps currently under construction by the Ethiopian government. Imagery previously shared by the Office of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed released several months ago to document the commencement of gold mining projects in the area closely matches the same locations and structures that Reuter now presents as evidence of a rebel training camp,” Conflict Zone (@breaking_bre) posted on X on February 10, 2026. The account’s posts typically emphasise ENDF advances, TPLF losses, and local support for federal forces, while portraying Eritrean forces in adversarial terms.
However, a simple reverse image search of the images in the post was conducted, leading us to Facebook posts shared in September by the Ministry of Mining and the Benshangul-Gumuz Prosperity Party, which associated the pictures with the Kumruk Gold mining project.
The image shared on the official pages shows a large industrial ore-processing facility with processing tanks, conveyors, pipelines, buildings, and a water-management pond beside excavated ground. Its layout is consistent with a gold-processing plant, possibly using tank-leaching technology.
A screenshot shows a post describing allegations of the RSF-linked military training camp as false
A screenshot shows a Kumruk Gold project shared by the Benshangul-Gumuz Prosperity Party. The post states, “The Ministry of Mines has announced that Kurmuk Gold Mine PLC has completed preparations and reached the final stage for its trial gold production.”
After geolocating the gold mine, we were able to determine that the alleged RSF training camp is situated a significant distance from the mining site. The shortest distance between the two locations is 54.32km (33.75 miles), indicating that the claim that the satellite image analysed in the Reuters investigation is actually showing the gold mining camps is false.
Image shows a satellite image of the Kumruk Gold project and an on-ground match
Image shows a satellite image of the Kumruk Gold project and an on-ground match
The distance between the two points and the calculation made to claim their distance
Additionally, satellite imagery of Assosa Airport from 2023 to 2026 shows changes to the site, including the construction of a hangar, an adjoining apron and additional paved areas near the runway. The most recent imagery reviewed for this investigation, dated August 5 2026, shows a metal-framed hangar connected to a paved apron.
These developments are consistent with the construction of new aviation infrastructure. However, satellite imagery alone cannot establish that the hangar was built for military purposes or that it is intended to store drones. Those possibilities require corroborating evidence.
The overlap between Reuters’ findings and the developments observed in our own imagery analysis makes Assosa Airport an important site for further investigation. Nevertheless, the construction visible in the imagery should be distinguished from claims about the airport’s operational role and any direct connection to RSF activity.
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